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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, Missouri courts have followed the traditional rule that
even the slightest contributory negligence of a plaintiff completely bars recovery.' The harshness of the rule gave rise to the doctrine of last clear chance. 2
Although last clear chance alleviated some of the hardship on a negligent
plaintiff, it was not totally satisfactory because it shifted the loss entirely onto
the defendant.3 Before 1978, these all-or-nothing rules were accompanied by a
rule which provided that a joint tortfeasor could not maintain an action for
contribution against the other wrongdoer unless there was a joint judgment
against them.4 Again, as between two wrongdoers, the loss was many times
borne by only one.
1. See, e.g., Walsh v. Southtown Motors Co., 445 S.W.2d 342, 348 (Mo.
1969); Worth v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 334 Mo. 1025, 1029-30, 69 S.W.2d 672, 674
(1934); McGowan v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 109 Mo. 518, 521, 19 S.W. 199, 202
(1892) (en banc).
2. See James, Last Clear Chance: A TransitionalDoctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704,
706-07 (1938); Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should It Provide?,
10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 220, 223 (1977).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS 428 (4th ed. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Layman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Mo. App.,
K.C.D. 1977).
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In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co.,' the Missouri Supreme Court took the first significant step toward a system of comparative fault by allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors on the basis of
relative fault. Subsequently, however, the court refused to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, deferring
instead to the General Assembly.0 The legislature, in turn, passed up numerous opportunities to adopt comparative negligence."
Finally, in Gustafson v. Benda," the supreme court took a radical step
toward the just allocation of tort losses. In a sweeping opinion, the court abolished the doctrine that contributory negligence completely bars recovery as
well as the doctrine of last clear chance. 9 In the aftermath, Missouri law now
recognizes a system of "pure" comparative fault"0 which distributes losses to
all responsible parties. 1
This landmark case arose when the plaintiff, Tom Gustafson, was passing
a line of cars on his motorcycle. 2 Just as Gustafson's motorcycle was overtaking the defendant's car, the defendant made a left turn.'3 In the ensuing accident, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries for which he brought an action
based on the "humanitarian doctrine."' 4 At trial, the jury found for the plain5. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
6. See, e.g., Steinman v. Strobel, 589 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
7. See, e.g., H.B. 1123, 82d Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1984); H.B. 860,
81st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1980); S.B. 207, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.
Sess. (1980).
8. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
9. Id. at 15.
10. In this Comment, the terms comparative fault and comparative negligence
are sometimes used interchangeably. The apparent distinction between the two terms
relates to their applicability to strict liability actions. Some jurisdictions recognize
"comparative negligence" but do not compare the strict liability of one party to the
ordinary negligence of another. See, e.g., Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, ,
553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (no appropriate basis of comparison); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974) (comparative negligence statute does not apply to strict liability). In contrast, the concept ofl"comparative
fault" is broad enough to cover strict liability. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying
text.
11. In some circumstances, Missouri law will not completely distribute losses in
accordance with respective fault. For example, the way in which settling and immune
parties are treated may cause some parties to bear more of a loss than their fault would
indicate. See infra notes 93-95, 105-07 and accompanying text.
12. 661 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982), rev'd, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1983) (en banc). The facts of the case are found in the court of appeals opinion, 661
S.W.2d at 29-33.
13. Id. at 32.
14. Id. Missouri has recognized a unique form of last clear chance known as the
humanitarian doctrine under which a plaintiff may recover if he was in a position of
"immediate danger" and the defendant was thereafter negligent in failing to prevent
the accident. For a discussion of Missouri's humanitarian doctrine and the concept of
"immediate danger," see Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 535, 540-43,
supplemented, 557 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); see also W. PROSSER, supra
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/9
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tiff and awarded damages. 15 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District reversed, stating that under a proper interpretation of last clear
chance the plaintiff should recover, but under existing Missouri law the plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case. 16 Specifically, the court suggested
that McClanahan v.\St. Louis Public Service Co.,"' had erroneously eliminated any distinction between last clear chance and humanitarian negligence.' 8 Instead of allowing recovery by the plaintiff, the appellate court invited the Missouri Supreme Court to reexamine the law in. this area.
The supreme court responded by adopting pure comparative fault 9 under
which a party who is ninety-nine percent at fault still may collect one per cent
of his damages.20 Moreover, in a remarkable feat of judicial legislation, the
court announced that "insofar as possible," Missouri would administer its system of comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act (UCFA). 1 The UCFA and its comments purport to explain the application of comparative fault in the context of many substantive areas of tort law.
This Comment will examine these areas and reveal inconsistencies between the
UCFA and Missouri law. 22 In addition, this Comment will look to other comparative fault jurisdictions to suggest possible solutions to problem areas.
note 3, at 432.
15. 661 S.W.2d at 30.
16. Id. at 34.
17. 363 Mo. 500, 251 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
18. 661 S.W.2d at 32, 34; see also Becker, The HumanitarianDoctrine, 15
Mo. L. REV. 359, 362 (1950) (many "humanitarian" cases are really last clear chance
cases).
19. 661 S.W.2d at 15. Many other judicial adoptions of comparative negligence
have also been of the "pure" type. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska
1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975) (en banc); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Goetzman v.
Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich.
638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). The
Supreme Court of West Virginia adopted the "modified" form of comparative negligence. See Bradley v. Appalacian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979).
20. See 661 S.W.2d at 15. The Gustafson court founded its actions on principles of "fairness." Id.
21. Id. The Act can be found in 12 U.L.A. 34 (Supp. 1985). The Act also appears in an appendix to the Gustafson opinion. 661 S.W.2d at 17-21. Apparently, no
jurisdiction has yet adopted the Act in its entirety. See 12 U.L.A. 34 (Supp. 1985).
Washington follows some of the Uniform Act. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005.050 (Supp. 1983). Minnesota, a "modified" comparative fault jurisdiction, follows the
"fault" provision of the Uniform Act. Compare MINN. STAT. § 604.01(a) (Supp. 1983)
with UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 1 (b), 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985).
22. The Uniform Act became effective in Missouri for cases tried after January
31, 1984. Although it is not yet clear what the court meant by stating that Missouri
law will follow the Uniform Act "insofar as possible," the court will not follow section
6 of the Uniform Act because of a conflict with existing statutory law. Gustafson, 661
S.W.2d at 15 n.10; see infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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CAUSATION

All legal requirements of causation will continue to apply under the
UCFA. Rules of cause-in-fact and proximate cause apply to both fault as the
basis of liability and contributory fault.23 The trier of fact is to consider the
causal relationship between the conduct complained of and the damages
claimed when assessing percentages of fault.24
Missouri courts have required both "but for" and proximate causation
before liability will be imposed. 25 The test for proximate cause is whether,
after the occurrence, the injury appears to be the reasonable and probable
consequence of the act or omission, and not whether a reasonable person could
have foreseen the particular injury.26 An intervening cause may relieve a defendant from liability, unless the intervening force was forseeable.2 Moreover,
even under comparative fault, a plaintiff may be barred from recovery if his
conduct is found to be the "sole proximate cause" of his damages.2 8
III.

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE

The comments to the UCFA make clear that imputed fault comes within
the meaning of contributory fault. 29 Where the plaintiff's claim is derivative
from an injury to a third person, such as a loss of consortium, Missouri courts
have imputed the negligence of the injured person to the plaintiff. 0 In such a
case, plaintiff's recovery should now be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to the injured person.3
23. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985); id. § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985).
24. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1985); id. § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1985). Other factors to be considered in arriving at percentages of fault include: (1) the actor's awareness of the danger involved; (2) the
potential severity of the risk of harm; (3) the utility of the actor's conduct; and (4) any
exigent circumstances requiring hasty decision. Id.
25. See Bass v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 661 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Mo. App., E.D.

1983).

26. Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568, 571-72 (Mo. App., E.D. 1983).
27. See Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 298 (Mo. App., E.D.
1983).
28. See Minor v. Zidell Trust, 618 P.2d 392, 394 (Okla. 1980) (defendant not
liable because plaintiff's conduct was a supervening cause). Missouri law presently prohibits the use of a "sole cause" instruction. See Mo. APPROVED INSTR. 1.03 (1965).
Nevertheless, sole cause can be argued to the jury. Hoehn v. Hampton, 483 S.W.2d
403, 409 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1972).
29. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 34 (Supp. 1985) states
"'Contributory fault chargeable to the claimant' includes legally imputed fault."
30. See, e.g., Huff v. Trowbridge, 439 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. 1969) (wife may
not recover for loss of consortium if husband was contributorily negligent, because her
claim is merely derivative).
31. See, e.g., Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Alaska 1979) (where
husband sues for personal injuries and wife sues for loss of consortium, wife's damages
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/9
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In actions which are not truly derivative, fault nevertheless may be im3 2
puted because of a relationship between the plaintiff and another. Missouri
courts, however, have not imputed negligence merely because of a relationship
between the plaintiff and a third person33 unless there is an agency or joint
enterprise relationship. 3 4 In addition to imputing fault, a court may treat two
persons as a single party for purposes of allocating fault, as, for example, in
35
the case of a principal and agent or manufacturer or retailer of a product.
IV.

FAILURE TO AVOID INJURY OR MITIGATE DAMAGES

Under the UCFA, failure to avoid injury or mitigate damages is fault
which will reduce the plaintiff's recovery.36 Failure to avoid an injury can take
many forms, however, and it is not clear that it will always reduce the plaintiff's recovery. For example, Missouri courts have indicated that the failure to
use a seat belt is not a defense. 37 The UCFA comments state that negligent
are diminished by percentage of fault attributable to husband); Acevedo v. Acosta, 296
So. 2d 526, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (husband's damages for medical expenses
incurred on behalf of wife reduced by negligence attributable to wife); Victorson v.
Milwaukee & Surburban Trans. Co., 70 Wis. 336, 234 N.W.2d 332 (1975) (consortium claim reduced by negligence attributable to wife); cf. Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal.
App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (action for loss of consortium is not derivative; therefore, negligence of one spouse not attributable to other
spouse).
32. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (mother's damages for mental distress caused by witnessing injury to child are reduced by both her
negligence and the child's negligence).
33. See, e.g., Graeff v. Baptist Temple, 576 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)
(negligence not imputed from mother to son); Morris v. Israel Bros., Inc., 510 S.W.2d
437 (Mo. 1974) (driver's negligence not imputed to passenger absent contention that
passenger entered car with knowledge of driver's intoxication); Price v. Bangert Bros.
Road Builders, 490 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1973) (negligence of parent not imputed to child);
Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App., E.D. 1975) (same).
34. See Stover v. Patrick, 459 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1970) (neither husband and
wife relationship, nor family purpose doctrine, nor joint ownership of automobile is
sufficient to impute negligence of driver-spouse to passenger-spouse); Sanfilippo v.
Bolle, 432 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1968) (absent joint enterprise or agency relationship, the
negligence of one parent would not be imputed to the other parent); Robinson v. St.
John's Medical Center, 508 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. App., Spr. D. 1974) (joint control is sine
qua non of joint effort or enterprise sufficient to impute negligence).
Other comparative negligence jurisdictions also do not impute fault because of a
relationship unless there is an agency relationship or joint enterprise. See, e.g., Hass v.
Kessell, 432 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1968) (negligence of driver not imputed to passenger);
Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978) (negligence not imputed from driver of car
to owner).
35. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT AcT § 2(a)(2), § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.
1985).
36. See UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT § 1(b), § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp.
1985); see also Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 103 (Minn. 1983) (unreasonable
failure to mitigate damages is "fault" which reduces recovery).
37. See Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App., St. L.D. 1970) (as a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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failure to fasten a seat belt would diminish recovery of damages where the
lack of a seat belt increased the severity of the injuries. s8
V.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Assumption of risk has been categorized as express or implied, primary or
secondary, and reasonable or unreasonable. 39 Whether an assumption of risk is
express or implied depends upon the manner in which plaintiff accepts the
risk. Acceptance of a risk may be by express consent, or implied from the
surrounding circumstances.4 Primary assumption of risk refers to situations
where the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff."" Secondary assumption of
risk is the assumption of negligently created risks.4 2 Unreasonable assumption
assumption of
of risk occurs when a risk is negligently assumed. 3 Reasonable
44
risk is not fault and will, therefore, not be a defense.
Under the UCFA, only unreasonable implied assumption of risk is treated
as a form of comparative fault.4 5 Reasonable assumption of risk will not rematter of law, evidence of the failure to use a seat belt is inadmissible to show lack of
due care). Compare Price v. Bangert Bros. Road Builders, 490 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Mo.
1973) (dicta) (error to show non-use of seat belt) with Uribe v. Armstrong Rubber &
Tire Co., 55 A.D.2d 869, 870, 390 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1977) (upholding reduction of
plaintiff's recovery because of failure to wear a seat belt). For a discussion of non-use
of seat belts as evidence of comparative negligence, see Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 239
(1979).
38. See UNIF. ComP. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1985).
39. In Missouri, assumption of risk has been based upon a voluntary consent,
express or implied, to accept the danger of a known and appreciated risk. See Turpin v.
Shoemaker, 427 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. 1968); see also Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d
11, 14 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (whether plaintiff has assumed risk of defendant's reckless conduct in an athletic event is a question for the jury).
40. See Kionka, Implied Assumption of the Risk: Does It Survive Comparative
Fault?, 1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 371, 374-75.
41. See id. at 376; see, e.g., Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 351
(Minn. 1979).
42. Kionka, supra note 40, at 378.
43. Id. at 382.
44. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1985);
Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence to Misuse and
Assumption of the Risk, 43 Mo. L. REv. 643, 662 (1978).
45. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1985); see,
e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 820, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 874 (1975) (court will treat assumption of risk like any other form of contributory
, 560 P.2d 105, 108 (1977)
negligence); Brown v. Kreuser, 38 Colo. App. 554,
(same); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668, 687 (Mont. 1980) (dicta)
(same); Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981)
(secondary assumption of risk is treated in same manner as contributory negligence
under comparative negligence statute); see also Anderson v. Cahill, 528 S.W.2d 742,
749 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (Donnelly, J., concurring) (assumption of risk should be
abrogated upon adoption of comparative negligence); Kionka, supra note 40, at 381
(unreasonable assumption of risk overlaps completely with contributory negligence).
For a good discussion of the effect of adoption of comparative negligence systems on
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/9
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duce recovery. 46 Assumption of risk will continue to be a complete bar to recovery where the plaintiff expressly consents to the presence of an obvious
plaintiff. In either of
hazard or where the defendant owes "no duty" to the
47
these situations, a plaintiff will not recover damages.
VI. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
The UCFA provides for the diminution of plaintiff's recovery even where
the defendant's negligence is based on the violation of a statute.48 To utilize
negligence per se in Missouri, it must appear that the injured party was within
the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute, that the injury was
of a character the statute was designed to prevent, and that the violation of
the statute was the proximate cause of the injury.49 Contributory fault will not
reduce recovery, however, where the statute is intended to protect the plaintiff
despite his shortcomings. 50 The plaintiff's violation of a statute may also constitute contributory negligence per se and thereby reduce his recovery.5 '
VII.

STRICT LIABILITY

There is a conceptual problem in applying comparative fault to strict liability. The difficulty is that in strict liability cases the defendant is held liable
without regard to fault. Consequently, there may be nothing to compare with
the plaintiff's fault.52
The UCFA specifically applies to actions based on strict liability.53 The
assumption of risk, see Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 700 (1982).
46. UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1985);
Fischer, supra note 44, at 662.

47.

UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1985); see

Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Minn. 1979).

48. See UNIF. Comp. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985); see
also Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842, 610 P.2d 1107 (1980) (apply-

ing comparative negligence to negligence per se); Scott v. Independent School Dist.,
256 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 1977) (same).
49.

Hartenbach v. Johnson, 628 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982);

Purdy v. Foreman, 547 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. App., Spr. D. 1977).
50. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT AcT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 1985);
see, e.g., D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890, 917 (1983) (child labor
law deemed to provide for full recovery notwithstanding plaintiff's contributory
negligence).
51. See, e.g., Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051
(5th Cir. 1979) (applying Florida law).
52. See Fischer, ProductsLiability-Applicabilityof Comparative Negligence,

43 Mo. L. REv. 431, 434 (1978).
53. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1985). Other

jurisdictions have also applied comparative negligence to strict liability. See, e.g.,

Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). For a good discussion of
the applicability of comparative negligence to actions based on strict liability, see Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 633 (1981).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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UCFA avoids the absence of a basis of comparison in these cases by defining
"fault" to cover claims for injuries resulting from unreasonably dangerous
products,5 4 ultrahazardous activities, 55 and breaches of warranty sounding in
tort.5 Under the UCFA, misuse generally reduces recovery. 57 The Act, however, does not apply to a misuse giving rise to a danger that the defendant
could not have reasonably anticipated and guarded against. In these cases, the
product is simply not defective or unreasonably dangerous.58
In Missouri, a plaintiff has the burden of showing the product was being
put to a use reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer.55 Missouri courts
have distinguished between contributory negligence, which is not a defense in
strict liability actions, and contributory fault, which is a defense. To relieve
defendant of liability, it must be shown that the plaintiff discovered the defect
and was aware of the danger, but nevertheless proceeded unreasonably to
make use of
the product and was thus injured. This is the defense of contribu60
fault.
tory
54. See UNIF. CoMp. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985). It
has been suggested that where comparative negligence is applied to a products liability
claim, the plaintiff's conduct should be compared to that of a reasonable man in similar
circumstances and his recovery should be reduced by the amount that his conduct deviated from the objective standard. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 449; see also Sanford
v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 296 Or. 590, -, 642 P.2d 624, 633 (1982)
(plaintiff's conduct measured against reasonable man standard and recovery diminished
accordingly).
55. UNIF. CoMp. FAULT AcT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1985).
56. See UNIF. Comp. FAULT ACT § l(b), § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp.
1985). When a claim based on breach of warranty sounds in contract, however, it is not
covered by the Uniform Act. Id.; see, e.g., Peterson v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 318
N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982).
57. "Fault includes .
misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise
would be liable." See UNIF. CoMip. FAULT ACT § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1985); see,
e.g., Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981) (plaintiff's misuse of
winch compared to defendant's strict liability).
58. UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1985); see
Fischer, supra note 44, at 643 (under principles of comparative negligence, misuse is
sometimes a complete defense, sometimes a partial defense, and sometimes no defense
at all); Fischer, Role of Misuse in ProductsLiability Litigation, 35 J. Mo. BAR 304
(1979) (same).
59. See McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1982);
Coulter v. Michelin Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Mo. App., S.D.), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 906 (1982); Mo. APPROVED INSTR. 25.04.
60. Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 787 n.6 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc) (per curiam); see also Mo. APPROVED INSTR. 32.23 (affirmative defense instruction for products liability); cf Dripps, Comparative Fault and Comparative Negligence-Is There a Difference?, 72[1] ILL. B.J. 16 (1983) (comparative negligence
which consists of ordinary negligence or failure to discover a defect does not diminish
recovery but comparative fault which consists of assumption of risk and misuse will
diminish a plaintiff's recovery). The Uniform Act states that contributory fault diminishes recovery "whether it was previously a bar or not, as, for example, in the case of
ordinary contributory negligence in an action based on strict liability." UNIF. COMP.
FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/9

8

Conway: Conway: Comparative Fault in Missouri

1985]

COMPARATIVE FAULT
VIII.

WRONGFUL DEATH

Missouri's wrongful death statute provides that a defendant may assert
"any defense the defendant would have against the deceased." 6' Accordingly,
the contributory negligence of the decedent is a defense to this action even
though it is not conceptually "imputed" to the plaintiff. Missouri courts have
also held that a plaintiff's negligence in a wrongful death action will bar recovery.62 Negligence of one beneficiary under the wrongful death statute, however, has not barred the recovery of the other beneficiaries.6
The UCFA definition of contributory fault is broad enough to cover the
negligence of both the decedent and the plaintiff. Where the fault of a person
is not strictly imputed, but nonetheless would have previously barred the plaintiff's recovery, such recovery is now diminished by the percentage of fault attributable to the other person. 4 The UCFA also reduces a plaintiff's recovery
because of his own negligence.6 5
IX.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Missouri's statutory scheme of workers' compensation provides for recovery by employees "irrespective of negligence." 6 The statute also immunizes
employers from liability to third parties for contribution. 7 The UCFA comments briefly address this area, but do not purport to change state law. 6
Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that where the UCFA
conflicts with a Missouri statute, the statute will govern.69 Therefore, the Gus61. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.085 (Cum. Supp. 1983). See generally Note, Missouri's New Wrongful Death Act, 45 Mo. L. REV. 476 (1980).
62. See, e.g., Slagle v. Singer, 419 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1967) (action by surviving
spouse for wrongful death is barred by surviving spouse's negligence); State ex rel. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Pinnell, 605 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (negligence of parent bars his action for wrongful death of child).
63. Sanfilippo v. Bolle, 432 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1968) (absent joint enterprise or
agency relationship, negligence of one parent not imputed to other parent).
64. UNIF. Comp. FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985).
65. Cf. Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 472 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Miss. 1979)
(plaintiff's negligence will not diminish recovery where statute allows recovery if decedent could have recovered).
66. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120(1) (1978).
67. Id.; see State ex rel. Hillyard Chem. Co. v. Shoenlaub, 610 S.W.2d 957
(Mo. 1981) (per curiam) (employer is immunized from liability to third party by workers' compensation law); State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (employer who is immune under workers'
compensation statute cannot be held liable for contribution).
68. The last section of the comment to section 6 of the Uniform Act briefly
mentions workers' compensation, employer immunity, and third party liability to employees. In another section, however, the Uniform Act states that contributory fault
will reduce recovery whether it was previously a bar or not. UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT §
1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1983).
69. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15 n.10 (legislative provision on releases will gov-
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tafson opinion should not affect this statutorily authorized scheme of recovery.
X.

RECKLESS CONDUCT

The concept of "fault" under the UCFA is broad enough to encompass
acts which are reckless.70 In contrast, intentional conduct is not to be compared under the UCFA.7 1 Reckless conduct includes "gross negligence" and,
in some jurisdictions, "willful and wanton" misconduct as well.7 2 Sometimes,
however, willful conduct is akin to intentional conduct. In those cases, it
should not be a basis of comparison."
Punitive damages are sometimes available when a defendant's conduct is
characterized as reckless or willful and wanton. 7 While Missouri courts have
associated "willful and wanton" conduct with intentional torts, recovery of punitive damages has been allowed when the defendant's conduct was completely
indifferent to or in conscious disregard for the safety of others.75 The UCFA
does not address the question of whether punitive damages should be reduced
by the plaintiff's share of fault. Comparative negligence jurisdictions generally
have not reduced the recovery of punitive damages.7 6 This is apparently because punitive damages are designed to punish rather than compensate. 77
XI. CONTRIBUTION
The Missouri Supreme Court established a right to contribution among
78
joint tortfeasors in Missouri PacificRailroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co.
The court limited its decision to joint tortfeasors who are culpably negligent,
which implies that Whitehead & Kales is not applicable where one tortfeasor
ern and Uniform Act section 6 will not be followed).
70. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1985). See generally Hasenfus, The Role of Recklessness in American Systems of Comparative
Fault, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1982).
71. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985).
72. Uniform Act section I comment states that sometimes "reckless conduct
goes by a different name such as willful or wanton misconduct." UNIF. COMP. FAULT
ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1985); see also Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d
717, 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 446 (1980) (comparative negligence applies even though
either party's conduct is willful and wanton); Personal Representative of Estate of
Starling v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (plaintiff
who is guilty of "gross" misconduct may recover from a less culpable defendant).
73. See Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979).
74. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 275, 294 N.W.2d
437, 442 (1980); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979).
75. Sharp v. Robberson, 405 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Mo. 1973) (en banc).
76. See, e.g., Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 194 (Wyo. 1979). But see
Perdernales Elec. Coop. v. Schulz, 583 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (recovery of exemplary damages reduced by proportion of plaintiff's negligence).
77. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, _ 686 P.2d 112, 121 (1984).
78. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en bane).
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is strictly liableJ The UCFA does not appear to be so limited. Instead, it
speaks of a right of contribution existing "between or among two or more
persons who are jointly or severally liable."8 Because it is based upon principles of "relative fault," Missouri's law of contribution is consistent with contribution based upon "comparative fault" under the UCFA.8'
The Gustafson opinion suggested liberal use of joinder so that the fault of
all parties may be compared in a single lawsuit.82 Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 52.11 allows for impleader of third party defendants. 83 The UCFA provides that only parties are assessed a percentage of fault.8 4 "Phantom" fault is
not considered by the jury.8 5 Both plaintiffs and defendants will, therefore,
have incentive to join all possible parties to make their respective percentages
of fault appear smaller.86
87
The UCFA specifically retains the doctrine of joint and several liability.
This rule breaks down, however, when one defendant is insolvent and the
plaintiff has contributed to his own injury. In this situation, the UCFA reallocates the insolvent defendant's share of the loss among the plaintiff and all
solvent defendants in proportion to their relative fault.88 The rule of joint and
79.

Id. at 468 n.2.

UNIF. CoMP. FAULT ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 46 (Supp. 1985); see also Busch
v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977) (ordinary negligence of one
defendant compared with strict liability of other defendant for purpose of
contribution).
Contribution between successive tortfeasors has not been allowed in Missouri because there is no common liability to the plaintiff. State ex rel. Baldwin v. Gaertner,
613 S.W.2d 638, 640-41 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). Similarly, the Uniform Act does not
allow contribution "[i]f the defendants cause separate harms or if the harm is found to
be divisible on a reasonable basis." UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT § 4 comment, 12 U.L.A.
47 (Supp. 1985). See generally Anderson, Recent Developments in Missouri Tort Law,
48 UMKC L. REV. 660 (1980); Comment, Contribution in Missouri-Procedureand
Defenses Under the New Rule, 44 Mo. L. REv. 691 (1979).
81. See 566 S.W.2d at 472; UNIF. CoMp. FAULT ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 47
(Supp. 1985) (basis for contribution is each person's equitable share of the obligation);
id. § 5(a) (same), 12 U.L.A. 47 (Supp. 1985).
82. 661 S.W.2d at 15.
80.

83.
84.
85.

Mo. R. Civ. PROc. 52.11.
UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985).
Id. § 2, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985).

86. See id., 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985). Rules of discretionary impleader
should be applied liberally. Compare Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633
S.W.2d at 733 (Welliver, J., concurring) (discussing desirability of making impleader
mandatory) with Note, A Separate Cause of Action for Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors, 49 Mo. L. REV. 121, 131 .(1984) (discussing undesirability of making impleader mandatory). See generally id.; Comment, supra note 80, at 699.
87. See UNIF. CoMp. FAULT ACT § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1985).
This is consistent with present and prior Missouri law. See Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at
16; Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 474.
88. UNIF. COMp. FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1985). Under this
section, the court "reallocated" an uncollectable amount among all parties at fault in
accordance with their respective fault. For example, assume that the plaintiff is 10% at
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several liability "breaks down" here in that a plaintiff must absorb part of the
insolvent defendant's share and, therefore, cannot recover the total amount of
his judgment against any defendant who is liable.8 9 Before Gustafson, Missouri law placed the risk of insolvency on defendants. 90 Accordingly, it is not
clear whether Missouri courts will follow the UCFA reallocation provision.
The Washington comparative fault statute, which contains many of the
UCFA's provisions, does not include the reallocation provision.9"
The UCFA makes no provision for the treatment of persons who have an
immunity from liability to the plaintiff.9 2 Immune persons are not liable for
contribution under prior Missouri law. 93 This rule is consistent with the holding of Whitehead & Kales that the right to contribution presupposes actionable negligence of both parties.94 This rule should not change under Gustafson
because, as a policy matter, the supreme court has indicated that allowing
contribution in this situation would defeat the purpose of granting the
immunity.9 5
Both the UCFA and Missouri law allow for contribution in a separate
action.96 Under the UCFA, the separate action for contribution is designed to
fault, defendant A is 40% at fault, and defendant B who is insolvent is 50% at fault. A
court will reallocate the fault of defendant B so that the plaintiff is considered to be
20% at fault and defendant A is considered 80% at fault. See Miller, Extending the
FairnessPrinciple of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 PAc. L.J. 835 (1983).
89. The comments to the Uniform Act state that the reallocation rule avoids the
unfairness of the common law rule of joint and several liability upon the solvent defen-

dants, as well as the unfairness to the plaintiff of completely abolishing joint and several liability. UNIF. CoMP. FAULT AcT § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1985).
90. See Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 474 (plaintiff may collect entire
judgment from his choice of tortfeasors).
91. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.925 (Supp. 1985).
92. UNIF. Comp. FAULT ACT § 6 comment, 12 U.L.A. 45 (Supp. 1985). Apparently, this issue was not addressed because it is treated in many different ways by the
states.
93. Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)
(parental immunity bars contribution); State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (employer who is immune

under workers' compensation statute cannot be held liable for contribution); Renfrow v.
Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (interspousal immunity bars contribution); cf. Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (parental immunity
not applied where mother and father have been divorced; father is not immune from
suit by daughter for wrongful death of mother).
94. 566 S.W.2d at 468.
95. Kendall, 634 S.W.2d at 179; Maryland Heights, 588 S.W.2d at 491 (quoting Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Simon, 359 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978)); see Glass v.
Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652 P.2d 948 (1982) (en banc). But cf. Pulliam,
Comparative Loss Allocation and the Rights and Liabilitiesof Third PartiesAgainst
an Immune Employer: A Modest Proposal, 31 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 80, 81 (1980)
(immunity from contribution often leads to the imposition of liability against third persons who are not primarily at fault).
96. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Mo. 1982);
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operate with a one year statute of limitations.9" Under Missouri law, the statute of limitations is five years.98 When the Missouri Supreme Court created
the right to contribution in a separate action it suggested a one year statute of
limitations, but stood by the legislatively-enacted five year statute. 99 The court
should reconcile this conflict between the Missouri statute and the UCFA by
deferring to the five year statute.
Rules of collateral estoppel will have an effect on the maintenance of a
separate action for contribution.' 00 In situations involving multiple parties and
multiple suits, collateral estoppel may be used to prevent re-litigation of the
issue of liability and the percentages of fault.' 0 ' However, a defendant in a
UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT §§ 4(a), 5(b), 12 U.L.A. 42, 43 (Supp. 1985). For a complete
discussion of the separate cause of action for contribution and its interaction with Missouri law, see Note, supra note 86.
97. The "one year" language appears in brackets signifying that a different
number may be used where desired. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 5(c), 12 U.L.A. 43
(Supp. 1985). Contribution may also be obtained in some instances when there has
been no judgment, for example, where a person discharges the common liability of the
joint tortfeasors. Id.; id. § 4(b)(1), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985). In the absence of a
judgment, contribution will be allowed only to the extent that the amount paid is reasonable. See id. § 4(b)(2), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1984); cf. Stephenson v. McClure, 606
S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (settling tortfeasor may obtain contribution).
98. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120(1) (1978); see Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 732;
Note, supra note 86, at 127. The running of the statute of limitations begins when a
joint tortfeasor pays more than his proportionate share. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Gray, 475 F. Supp 679, 681 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Simon v. Kansas City Rug Co., 460
S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. 1970). Under the Uniform Act, the statute of limitations begins
running at final judgment. See UNIF. COMP. FAULT AT § 5(c), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp.

1983).

99. Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 732-35; Note, supra note 86 at 127. A one year
statute promotes fairness by requiring the action to be brought while evidence is still
readily available to the contribution defendant. Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 733 (citing
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 201 N.W.2d 753
(1972)). See generally State ex rel. General Elec. Co. v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d 764,
767-68 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
100. Collateral estoppel is defined as "issue preclusion." See Davis, Collateral
Estoppel-An Awesome Specter, 34 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 73, 73 (1983). For a discussion of collateral estoppel in Missouri prior to Gustafson, see Note, supra note 86,
at 128.
101. Consider, for example, a case involving a multi-car accident in which the
first suit resulted in a finding that Driver A was not at fault and that Driver B was
100% at fault. In a later action, Driver C sues Driver A for personal injuries, and they
are each found to be 50% at fault. In a separate action for contribution by Driver A
against Driver B, may Driver A make Driver B reimburse him for the entire judgment?
See Carlson v. Yellow Cab Co., 308 Minn. 293, 242 N.W.2d 86 (1976) (answering in
the affirmative).
Alternatively, suppose that Driver C had sued Driver B for personal injuries. If
Driver B attempts to implead Driver A, may Driver A assert collateral estoppel to
dismiss a third-party suit? See id. (answering in the affirmative).
Finally, assume that in an action between Driver A and Driver B, Driver A is
found 100% at fault. In a subsequent action by Passenger against both Driver A and
Driver B, Passenger asserts collateral estoppel against Driver A. May Passenger neverPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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separate action for contribution cannot be bound by the findings of the original
action to which he was not a party. 02 He should, therefore, be permitted to
litigate issues such as the plaintiff's percentage of fault and the amount of
damages. 10 3 In these circumstances, the contribution defendant will be asserting the fault of a non-party. Although the UCFA prohibits the assessment of
fault to a non-party by the jury, 04 the contribution defendant should be able
to assert the plaintiff's fault because every party is entitled to at least one
opportunity to litigate the issues.
XII. SETTLEMENTS
The UCFA provision concerning the effect of a release directly conflicts
with Missouri legislation on the subject. Section 6 of the UCFA provides that
a release reduces a plaintiff's recovery by the released party's equitable share
of the obligation. 0 5 In contrast, the Missouri statute provides that a release
reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the greater of the amount stated in the re-

lease or the amount paid in consideration for it. 06 Although the two provisions
conflict, there are similarities. For example, both provide that a release of one
tortfeasor does not release other tortfeasors. Under
both statutes, a settling
07
defendant is released from all further liability.
The Gustafson court made it clear that the Missouri settlement statute
will remain in full force until the legislature chooses to change it.' 08 Other
theless re-litigate the case against Driver B? See Shubeck v. Ondek, 167 N.J. Super.
121, 400 A.2d 544 (1979) (held: no; plaintiff asserting offensive collateral estoppel
must accept the burden as well as the benefit). But cf. Shanley v. Callahan Indus., 54
N.Y.2d 52, 429 N.E.2d 104, 444 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1981) (if party is found 100% at fault
in first action, he is not precluded from seeking recovery from other parties in a later
action).
102. See Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 732 (contribution defendant is "entitled to a
full opportunity to defend against the present allegations of. . . fault and the amount
of damages which the injured party suffered"); see also Davis, supra note 100, at 76.
But see Note, Collateral Estoppel of Non-parties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486
(1974) (collateral estoppel may sometimes be used against a non-party).
103. See Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 732 (contribution defendant may assert "all
defenses which would have been available in the original action").
104. UNIF. COMP. FAULT AcT § 2(a)(2), § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp.
1985).
105.

Id. § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1985). This provision is in keeping with the

Uniform Act's emphasis upon basing liability on a party's equitable share of the
obligation.
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1984). The Missouri statute is based on
Section 4 of the 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12
U.L.A. 101 (1955). Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15 n.10. See generally Fischer, The
New Settlement Statute: Its History and Effect, 40 J. Mo. BAR 13 (1984).
107. Compare UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § 6 & § 6 comment, 12 U.L.A. 44-45
(Supp. 1985) with Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1984).
108. 661 S.W.2d at 16 n.10. The court invited the legislature to adopt section 6
of the Uniform Act. In the meantime, however, the courts will apply section 537.060.
Id. Because the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by the amount of the settlement and
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/9
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jurisdictions have found judicially adopted comparative negligence to be compatible with release statutes similar to the Missouri statute.' 09 Consequently,
Missouri courts should have ample guidance in dealing with the effect of settlements on negligence actions." 0
One important issue involves whether the amount of a settlement should
be subtracted from the plaintiff's award before or after diminution for contributory negligence. If the award is reduced by the amount of the settlement
before the plaintiff's percentage of fault is applied, there will be a relatively
smaller reduction of the award. In contrast, if the plaintiff's award is reduced
by his percentage of fault before subtracting the amount of the settlement, the
plaintiff's ultimate recovery will be smaller.
The Washington Supreme Court has considered this precise issue."" The
Washington settlement statute requires that the claim of the releasing party
be reduced by the amount of the settlement." 2 By defining the plaintiff's
"claim" as the amount attributable to the negligence of others, the court correctly reduced the award by the percentage of plaintiff's negligence before
subtracting the amount of the settlement." 3 Missouri's settlement statute similarly requires the "claim" to be reduced." 4 Consequently, the same result
should be obtained under Missouri law.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

The Missouri Supreme Court has made an innovative move in making
Missouri the first state to adopt judicially a significant portion of the UCFA.
Although the Gustafson decision leaves many questions in Missouri tort law
not by the released party's equitable share of the obligation, there is no need to assess a
percentage of fault to a released party as required by section 2(a)(2) of the Uniform
Act. Therefore, there is no reason to join a settling tortfeasor into the action.
109. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
578 P.2d 899, 912-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (application of comparative negligence to settlement statute); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Placek v.
City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); CAL. (CIV. PROC.)
CODE § 877 (West 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 302(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983);
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.2925(d) (Supp. 1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925(4)
(Callaghan Supp. 1984). Washington, which has legislatively adopted some sections of
the Uniform Act, also reduces a plaintiff's recovery by the amount of the settlement
and not by the released party's equitable share. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.060
(Supp. 1985).
110. See Mayhew v. Berrien County Road Comm'n, 414 Mich. 399, 326
N.W.2d 366 (1982) (excellent discussion of the application of comparative negligence
to this type of settlement statute).
111. See Scott v. Cascade Structures, 100 Wash. 2d 537, 673 P.2d 179 (1983)
(en banc).
112. WASH. REv. STAT. § 4.22.060(2) (Supp. 1985).
113. See Lemos v. Eichel, 83 Cal. App. 3d 110, 147 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1978) (reducing claim by fault attributable to plaintiff first).
114. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1984).
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unanswered, the court has given the bench and bar guidance to structure the
interaction between comparative fault and Missouri law by utilizing the
UCFA and its comments. Many areas of Missouri tort law will not be affected
significantly by the adoption of comparative fault. Other areas of tort law will
benefit from principles derived from the UCFA.
In many ways, the UCFA fits nicely into the pattern of prior law. Comparative fault will further the goal of "fairness" which impelled the court to
allow contribution based on relative fault. The wrongful death statute is also
compatible with comparative fault. Most importantly, by completely eliminating contributory negligence as a bar to recovery, the adoption of the UCFA
has eliminated the need for artificial and unsatisfactory rules such as last clear
chance and humanitarian negligence.
Although the court stated that the UCFA will be followed "insofar as
possible," Missouri statutory law nevertheless will govern when in conflict with
the UCFA. Where the UCFA conflicts with existing court decisions, however,
the courts will be able to look to the UCFA and modify judge-made rules in
accordance with the process of common law. In the final analysis, the Missouri
Supreme Court appears to have committed itself to the structure of the
UCFA. This commitment will be beneficial to Missouri tort law by modernizing outmoded tort concepts. Through Gustafson, Missouri has become one of
the most progressive jurisdictions in the development of a just system for allocating tort losses.
RONALD
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